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Abstract 
 
Could a credit bureau incite banks to report correct information about their borrowers?                  
We show that banks will choose the incorrect information sharing in the last period to increase their 
profits. Interestingly, however, it is shown that this strategy is optimal at the second period only if 
the proportion of successful projects is superior to 50%. In that case the Credit Bureau should 
enforce a sufficiently high penalty in order to incite banks to share information honestly. The penalty 
threshold that conditions the efficiency of the credit bureau’s role is endogenously derived. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Many studies (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) showed that asymmetric information dampens the 
efficient functioning of credit markets. In one hand, the borrowers need to get information about 
interest rates offered by banks in order to make their deposit decision. In the other hand, banks 
collect information about their potential clients in order to offer them the volume of credit and the 
interest rate which corresponds to their risk class. This information search is costly for an individual 
bank and borrowers when there is no centralized organism in charge of its collection and 
distribution. Pagano and Jappelli (1993) show that lenders should choose the strategy of information 
sharing to increase the volume of lending and reduce information costs. This result is confirmed by 
Padilla and Pagano (1997) who show that the exchange of information not only reduces information 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, but also reduces moral hazard and adverse selection. 
This information sharing is facilitated by information brokers as Public Registers or Credit Bureaus 
that collect files and distribute information among the members of the information sharing system. 
Djankov et al. (2006) show that the presence of these two substitute organizations increase lending 
and favors the development of the information sharing system. However, banks might not have any 
incentive to exchange information if this strategy will erode their client niches. Thus, false 
information reporting (“dishonest” strategy) could be the strategy chosen by banks. This 
opportunistic behavior was analyzed by Semenova (2008) which investigated the following 
question: “has a bank any incentive to get benefit from information sharing without losing its 
competitive advantage?” 
To answer this question, Semenova (2008) developed a two-period credit market model. This market 
is compound of two types of agents: two identical banks and a continuum of entrepreneurs applying 
for a loan of size one they need to undertake a project. The entrepreneurs which are divided into two 
groups: high-ability and low-ability, choose the bank with cheaper credit. Semenova (2008) shows 
that banks will choose the dishonest strategy in the second period because it generates higher profit. 
Interpreting this result she suggested that a Credit Bureau could be a solution to this misreporting 
market distortion. However, since his model doesn’t include the Credit Bureau as an active agent, 
the suggested solution misses analytical foundations. 
In this paper we try to answer the following question: Could a credit bureau design an efficient 
mechanism to incite banks reporting correct information about their borrowers?   
To answer this question we depart from Semenova (2008) and propose two extensions. The first 
extension consists in adding a third period in order to explicit the Credit Bureau role. Indeed, no 
such role could take place in a two-period model since the dishonest strategy will remain the banks’ 
optimal strategy during the second period whatever the incentive mechanism designed by the Credit 
Burau. Hence, the latter will intervene after discovering banks choosing the dishonest strategy 
during the second period. The Credit Bureau intervenes by withdrawing the bank’s license (for the 
third period) and imposing a penalty that should be paid by the “dishonest” bank. We determine the 
efficient level of this penalty as a function of the different parameters of the model among which the 
characteristics of the credit market.  This leads us to the second extension of the paper which is 
considering a number n of operating banks in the credit market which interact in a spatial 
competition framework as considered by Grimaud and Rochet (1994) and Salop (1979). 
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This extension generates a more realistic credit market structure than Semenova (2008) and enables 
us to analyze of the interconnection between the credit bureau role and credit market structure.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers the model and the different 
interest rates in the case of honest reporting. Section 3 analyzes the role of Credit Bureau in the case 
of dishonest information sharing. Section 4 summarizes the findings. 
2  Model 
Departing from Semenova (2008) we propose an extended model with three periods and an active 
role for the Credit Bureau. The basic framework is the model developed by Padilla and Pagano 
(1997). 
2.1  Environment 
We consider a three-period credit market model with three actors: n identical banks indexed by 
(i=1,…,n), a continuum [0,1] of entrepreneurs and a Credit Bureau. Banks are located symmetrically 
around a circle of measure 1 and entrepreneurs are uniformly distributed around the circle. Each 
entrepreneur is situated between two banks i and i+1 and needs a loan of size 1 to undertake an 
investment project. He is located at xi∈[0,1/n] from bank i and  and xi+1 = 1/n - xi  from bank i+1.           
To ask for a loan an entrepreneur should select a bank taking in account the interest rate it charges 
and the transportation cost t.x he supports to reach it. Entrepreneurs are divided into two types: high-
ability entrepreneurs which are present in proportion γ and low-ability entrepreneurs which are in 
proportion 1- γ. High-ability entrepreneurs undertake risky projects yielding R* with probability p  
and zero with probability (1-p). Whereas, low-ability entrepreneurs undertake bad projects yielding 
nothing in all states of the nature. The parameters γ and p are public information since the beginning 
of the first period. This means that banks know the exact proportion of each type of entrepreneurs 
and know that a proportion γp among the high-ability ones will end the first period with successful 
projects. However, initially, they are unable to distinguish individually a high-ability entrepreneur 
from a low-ability one. This information will be partially discovered at the end of the first period. In 
fact, the success of a project will signals the high-ability type of the entrepreneur he undertook. 
However, a failing project could be a bad project (undertook by a low-ability entrepreneur) or a risky 
project (undertook by a high-ability entrepreneur) who failed. Table 1 presents the composition of 
the entrepreneurs’ population at the end of the first period (beginning of the second period) and at 
the end of the second period (beginning of the third period). 
Table 1. The composition of the entrepreneurs’ population 
At the beginning 
of the 1st   period At the beginning of the 2
nd  period At the beginning of the 3rd  period 
High-ability : γ 
Solvent 
high-ability :  
γp  
Solvent: 
γp 
Solvent high-ability : γp² 
Solvent : 
γp² + γ p(1-p) = γp Defaulting: γp(1-p) 
Defaulting 
high-ability: 
γ(1-p)      Defaulting: 
1 - γp 
Solvent : γ p(1-p) 
Defaulting: γ(1-p)2 Defaulting: 
γp(1-p) +   γ(1-p)2   
+ 1 - γ  
= 1 - γp 
Low-ability: 1 - γ   Defaulting 
low-ability:      
1 - γ 
Default: 1 - γ 
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Therefore, at the end of the first and second periods, the population of entrepreneurs is composed as 
following: γp the high-ability entrepreneurs whose risky projects succeed and 1 - γp entrepreneurs 
with failed projects. 
2.2 Time events 
At the first period: Every bank i=1,…,n offers a gross interest rate Ri1 for all types of entrepreneurs 
since it cannot distinguish between high-ability and low-ability ones. At the end of the first period, 
only a proportion p of the high-ability entrepreneurs have successful projects and repay their loans.                  
We assume that banks can observe the interest rates charged by other banks. However, we assume 
that banks can not observe for whom the interest rate was charged. Every bank i chooses the gross 
interest rate Ri1  to maximize its profit in the first period: 
   (1) 
Where  is the demand of the bank i that is negatively dependent of Ri1  and 
positively dependent of the two neighbors’ interest rate R1. The parameter R ≤ γp Ri1  represents the 
exogenous cost of capital. The parameter f represents a fixed cost paid by each bank to adhere to the 
information sharing system run by the Credit Bureau. 
At the second period: We assume that, at the beginning of the second period, banks share 
information about the past results of entrepreneurs and not their types. Padilla and Pagano (1999) 
show that this type of information sharing has a disciplinary effect on entrepreneurs. Bank i could 
report wrong information about its solvent high-ability clients in order to discourage competing 
banks attracting them and to be able to offer them relatively higher interest rates. In doing so, bank i 
makes additional profits on the loans granted to these solvent entrepreneurs. However, it runs the 
risk to be penalized by the Credit Bureau during the third period. This trade-off will be analyzed in 
the third section. 
We assume that entrepreneurs have no self-financing capital and spend all their profits at the end of 
the first period. Thus, in order to undertake a project during the second period they have to apply for 
a new loan. At the beginning of the second period, banks have acquired new information about the 
successful entrepreneurs. This enables them to charge differentiated interest rates. Let’s denote Ri21  
the gross interest rate charged by bank i to the proportion γp of the high-ability entrepreneurs whose 
projects succeed and repaid their first-period loan. We denote Ri22 , the gross interest rate charged by 
bank i to the first period defaulting entrepreneurs (whether they are a high-ability or low-ability 
type).  The latter are composed of the high-ability entrepreneurs whose risky projects failed (their 
proportion is γ(1-p)) and the low-ability entrepreneurs (their proportion is 1-γ). Thus, the total 
proportion of defaulting entrepreneurs is 1-γp. Bank i fixes the gross interest rates (Ri21, Ri22) that 
maximize its second-period profit: 
  
(2) 
Where  and  are respectively the demand for loan addressed to 
bank i by the successful and defaulting entrepreneurs. Only a proportion p of the first category of 
loans will be repaid. Whereas, the proportion of successful projects financed by the second category 
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of loans is pγ(1-p)/(1-γp). Indeed, as presented in Table 1, among the total proportion 1-γp only a 
proportion p of the γ(1-p) high-skilled entrepreneurs (whose projects failed in the first period) will 
succeed their projects during the second period.  
At the third period: Again, every existing bank i charges differentiated interest rates depending on 
the borrowers’ payment history. We denote Ri31 the interest rate charged by bank i to the high-ability 
entrepreneurs whose type is revealed during the two precedent periods1. Therefore, their total 
proportion is μ1= 2p(1-p)γ + γp2  or equivalently μ1=(2-p)γp. Let’s denote Ri32 the gross interest rate 
charged to the proportion (1-p)2γ of high-ability entrepreneurs who defaulted during the two first 
periods and the proportion (1-γ)  of low-ability entrepreneurs. Their total proportion is denoted             
μ2= (1-p)2γ + 1-γ. Bank i chooses the interest rates (Ri31, Ri32) that maximize its third period profit: 
  
(3) 
Where  and  are respectively the demand for loan 
addressed to bank i by the proportions μ1 and μ2 of the entrepreneurs. Only a proportion p of the 
first category of loans will be repaid. Whereas, the proportion of successful projects financed by 
the second category of loans is pγ(1-p)2/μ2. Indeed, among the total proportion μ2 only a 
proportion p of the γ(1-p)2 high-skilled entrepreneurs (whose projects failed in the two first 
periods) will succeed their projects during the third period. 
2.3 Entrepreneurs’ utility 
After obtaining a loan of size one at the beginning of period j=1, 2, 3, high-ability entrepreneur have 
to repay the principal and interests on the loan. This gross amount is also the gross interest rate 
which we denote Rij. The choice of an entrepreneur to ask for a loan from bank i or bank i+1 is the 
result of its utility Uj maximization at the beginning of period j : 
 (4) 
Finally, we assume that a low-ability entrepreneur (who knows his type since the beginning of 
period 1) undertakes a bad project because it provides him a positive utility.   
2.4 Interest rates in the case of honest information reporting 
In this subsection we determine the gross interest rates charged by banks in the three periods in the 
case of an honest information sharing. 
Proposition 1: In the case of honest information reporting: 
1) The gross interest rate fixed by banks are given by  
 
(5) 
                                                            
1 They are composed of the high-ability entrepreneurs whose projects succeeded in the two periods (their proportion is 
γp2 and those whose project succeed at period 1 or period 2 (their proportion is 2γp(1-p)). 
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(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
 
(9) 
2) The  profit of an individual bank during the three periods is given by: 
 
(10) 
 
(11) 
                                       
(12) 
Proof. See appendix. 
This proposition shows also that the transportation cost (which could be interpreted as the unitary 
degree of differentiation between banks) increases the bank’s profit. This is intuitive since the higher 
this cost the larger is the bank’s local monopoly niche. At the contrarily, profits is decreasing with 
the number of banks. 
3 Dishonest strategy and the role of Credit Bureau 
In the previous section we assumed that banks are sharing correct information about their clients and 
that they charge interest rates depending on the entrepreneur’s type. In maximizing their profits in 
each period they might share incorrect information about the solvent high-ability entrepreneurs when 
there is no control by the Credit Bureau. Nevertheless, all the actors of the credit market know that at 
the beginning of each period, there is a proportion γp of solvent high-ability entrepreneurs. In this 
case, following Semenova (2008), we assume that the dishonest strategy is based on two incorrect 
information reporting. The first one consists in reporting those solvent entrepreneurs as defaulters. 
The second one consists in reporting instead of them a proportion of defaulting entrepreneurs as 
high-ability entrepreneurs with successful projects. Proceeding this way, a bank may get additional 
profits in the second or third period. In our model, the Credit Bureau can discover this deviation at 
the beginning of the second or the third periods.  
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Competing banks and the Credit Bureau can observe2 the additional profits realized by the dishonest 
bank. This abnormal profit signals to the Credit Bureau the dishonest bank which will bear a penalty 
in the case of second period deviation. In the remainder of this section we determine the (gross) 
interest rates applied in case of misreporting and the additional profits realized by the “dishonest” 
bank. We will also specify the penalty threshold that Credit Bureau should apply to prevent the 
information misreporting.  
Depending on the values of the parameters γ and p we could identify two cases. In the first case, the 
proportion γp of high-ability entrepreneurs whose risky projects succeed is lower than the proportion 
1 - γp of all the defaulting entrepreneurs. This correspond to the case 1 - γp > γp or γp<1/2 which we 
denote case 1. The second case denoted case 2 is the opposite and takes place when  γp ≥1/2.   
3.1 Case 1: 1 - γp > γp or γp<1/2 
Under this case, a bank choosing the dishonest strategy will report that all the proportion γp of its 
high-ability solvent clients as low-ability or high-ability defaulting entrepreneurs (since it can’t 
distinguish the type of the defaulting entrepreneurs). Instead of them, it will select a proportion γp 
among the proportion 1 - γp of its defaulting clients to report as solvent. This dishonest strategy 
could take place at the beginning of the second or the third periods.  
3.1.1 The dishonest strategy at  the beginning of the third  period 
Table 2 presents the reporting of a bank that chooses the honest strategy at the beginning of second 
period and the dishonest strategy at the beginning of the third period. 
Table 2. Misreporting strategy only at the beginning of the 3rd period 
Entrepreneurs’ 
proportion 
True type of the 
entrepreneur’s  
1st period  
outcome 
of the loan 
Reported 
outcome at the 
beginning of 
the 2nd period   
2nd period  outcome 
of the loan  
Reported outcome              
at the beginning  of the  
3rd  period  
γp   High-ability Solvent Solvent 
Solvent 
γp² Solvent:  γp²    
Defaulting 
γp(1-p) 
Defaulting:          
γp(1-p) 
γ(1-p) High-ability Default Default 
Solvent  
γ p(1-p) 
Defaulting: 
θ = γ(1-p)2 + 1 - γ      
Solvent: 
γ[1+(1-p)(2p-1)]-1 
Defaulting 
γ(1-p)2 Solvent : γ(1-p)
2 
1 - γ Low-ability Default Default Default 1 - γ Solvent : 1 - γ 
 
This bank realizes an additional profit through charging a higher interest rates R3,2 (see equation (9)) 
for the proportion θ of the new-revealed high ability entrepreneurs. This is different from the case of 
an honest information reporting where the entire proportion γp + γ p(1-p) of revealed high-ability 
entrepreneurs (whose risky projects succeed at least once during the two first periods), are charged a 
                                                            
2 Technically, the reported information quality control tools are varied. We can mention for example comparison of data 
reported by banks with those situated in the insurance agencies databases, the offices of taxation or other credit 
institutions. 
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lower interest rate R3,1. We can easily show that the third period additional profit relatively to the 
honest strategy is given by: 
  
(14) 
Whereas, the third period profit is given by  where  the profit in case of honest 
reporting given by equation (12). In this case, the Credit Bureau discovers the dishonest bank at the 
end of the third period after observing the additional profit. However, the exclusion from the credit 
market doesn’t make a sense and the dishonest bank will not pay the penalty.  
3.1.2 The dishonest strategy at  the beginning of the second period 
A bank that chooses this strategy will realize additional profits in the second period. However, it will 
be discovered by the Credit Bureau at the end of the second period. The latter will charge it a penalty 
and exclude it from the credit market during the third period. The additional profit of this bank 
relatively to its rivals will be realized through charging higher interest rate R22 on the loans granted 
to the proportion γp of solvent entrepreneurs instead of R21. Using (6) and (7), it is straightforward to 
show that the additional profit (relatively to the second-period profit in case of honest strategy) :                          
  
(15) 
Equation (15) shows that this additional profit is decreasing with the number of banks. If the credit 
market is competitive and the number of banks is high, we showed that interest rates decrease and so 
do profits. Hence, in a less competitive credit market, banks have more incentive to choose the 
dishonest information report strategy. To prevent banks from deviating, the Credit Bureau charges                 
the bank a penalty C1 and withdraws its license excluding it from the credit market.  Thus, not only 
the bank pays the penalty C1 but also abandon its third-period profit.  Hence, a bank has no incentive 
to choose the dishonest strategy if the additional profit  realized during the second period 
minus the penalty C1 is lower than the third period misreporting profit  which it 
abandons. Therefore, the penalty Credit Bureau should apply to prevent the misreporting strategy 
verifies: 
 (16) 
 
Proposition 2:   
When the proportion of successful project is inferior to 50% (case 1) the dishonest strategy isn’t 
optimal at the second period.  
Proof. Using the expressions (14) and (15) and the fact that under case 1 we have γp < ½ it is 
straightforward to show that . This means that condition (16) holds and the bank by 
itself hasn’t an incentive to deviate at the second period. At the contrary, it is more profitable for it to 
misreport information at the beginning of period 3. Hence, when the proportion of successful 
projects are less than 50% there is no incentive for banks to deviate at the second period (this is 
because the condition γ(1-p) + (1 - γ) > γp is equivalent to 1/2 > γp ). 
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3.2 Case 2: 1-γp ≤ γp or γp ≥ ½  
In this case, the proportion γp of high-ability entrepreneurs whose risky projects succeed is higher 
than all the defaulting entrepreneurs: 1-γp.  A bank that chooses the dishonest strategy will report the 
proportion 1-γp of defaulting entrepreneurs as high-ability ones. However, it should report an 
additional γp – (1-γp) = 2γp - 1 as high-ability. It has no choice but selecting this latter proportion 
from the high-ability entrepreneurs whose projects effectively succeeded.  The remaining proportion 
of them (γp – (2γp - 1) = 1 - γp will be reported as low-ability.  
3.2.1 Misreporting at the beginning at the third period 
This situation occurs when the bank reported honestly the information at the second period and 
decides to misreport at the beginning of the third period. Table 3 presents the misreporting strategy 
of the bank. 
Table 3. Misreporting strategy only at the beginning of the 3rd period 
Entrepreneurs’ 
proportion 
1st period  
outcome of 
the loan 
Reported outcome 
at the beginning of 
the 2nd period  
2nd period  outcome of 
the loan 
Reported outcome at the beginning of the  
3rd  period  
High-ability :γ 
Solvent: γp Solvent 
Solvent:  γp²    Solvent:  γp²    
Defaulting:          
γp(1-p) Defaulting: γp(1-p) 
Default:      
γ(1 – p) Default 
Solvent  
γ p(1-p) 
Defaulting 
θ =   γ(1-p)2 + 1 - γ 
Solvent 
γ[1+(1-p)(2p-1)]-1 
Defaulting 
γ(1-p)2 Solvent : γ(1-p)
2 
Low-ability :1 - γ Default:        1 - γ Default 
Default 
1 - γ Solvent : 1 - γ 
 
This situation is equivalent to that described in subsection 3.1.1 and we obtain the same additional 
profit given by equation (14). In this case also, the Credit Bureau discovers the dishonest bank at the 
end of the third period after observing the additional profit. However, the exclusion from the credit 
market doesn’t make a sense and the dishonest bank will not pay the penalty. 
3.2.2 Misreporting at the beginning of the second period 
This corresponds to a situation where the bank chose the dishonest strategy since the second period. 
Table 4 presents the misreporting strategy of the bank. 
Table 4. Misreporting strategy at the beginning of the 2nd period 
Entrepreneurs’ 
proportion 
1st period  outcome 
of the loan 2
nd period  outcome of the loan  Reported type at the beginning of the 2nd period   
High-ability :γ 
Solvent: γp 
Solvent :  γp2 
Solvent : p(2γp- 1) 
Default : p(1 - γp) 
Defaulting:  γp (1–p) 
Solvent:  (1–p)(2γp- 1) 
Defaulting: (1–p) (1 - γp) 
Default:   γ(1 – p) Solvent: γ p (1 – p) Solvent : γ p(1-p) 
10 
Defaulting: γ(1-p)2 Solvent : γ(1-p)2 
Low-ability :1 - γ Default: 1 - γ Defaulting: 1 - γ Solvent: 1 - γ 
 
Choosing this strategy, the bank will realize additional profits through charging the proportion               
p(1 - γp) of high-ability entrepreneurs’ higher interest rate R22 instead of R21. Using the expressions 
(6) and (7) of the interest rates, we can easily calculate the second period additional profit:                                     
 
 (17)
Using equation (15), (17) and the condition 1-γp ≤ γp≤ γ it is easy to show  that the additional profit 
in case 1 is larger to that in the  case 2:  . Hence, the additional profits are higher 
when the proportion of high-ability entrepreneurs whose risky projects succeed is lower than those 
who default. This is because the scope of misreporting is larger for the bank.  
Proposition 2.  
When the proportion of successful project is superior to 50% (case 2: γp ≥ ½) the dishonest strategy 
isn’t optimal at the second period if and only if: 
 the Credit Bureau withdraw the dishonest bank license during the third period If  
 the Credit Bureau withdraw the dishonest bank license during the third period and imposes 
a penalty strictly superior to   if  where : 
  
 
 (18)
Proof. Taking in account the penalty and the exclusion from the credit market during period 3, the 
total profit of the deviating bank is given by: 
  (19)
Whereas the total profit of a bank choosing to deviate at the third period is given by 
 (20) 
Where the additional profit is given by equation (14). Hence, the threshold penalty that delays 
the misreporting to the final period of the game should verify: 
  (21)
11 
And the penalty threshold is given by 
  (22)
Finally, using equations (12), (14), (17) and (22) we obtain the expression (18)  
This proposition shows that the exclusion of the dishonest bank from the credit market during the 
third period is sufficient when the degree of differentiation of banks (the transport cost)  
exceeds a determined threshold. The intuition behind this is related to the trade-off that the dishonest 
bank faces. When  the third-period profit exceeds the additional profit it could make if it 
chooses the dishonest strategy during the second period. However, when   its monopoly power 
as well as its third-period profit are lower (see equations 12 and 14). In this case, the additional profit 
it could make during the second period is higher than the third-period profit. Therefore, the credit 
bureau has to impose a complementary sanction which is a penalty strictly superior to . It is also 
interesting to note that an increase in one or more of the two dimensions of competition between 
banks (the transport cost t and their number n)  lowers the penalty threshold .    
Conclusion 
In this paper we tried to answer the following question: Could a credit bureau design an efficient 
mechanism to incite banks communicating correct information about their borrowers?  
To answer this question, we extend the model of Semenova, M. (2008, “Information sharing in 
credit markets: incentives for incorrect information reporting,”Comparative Economic Studies, Vol. 
50, No. 3, pp. 381-415, 35) in two directions. The first extension consists in adding an explicit the 
role of the Credit Bureau in a third-period framework. The second extension is considering a credit 
market composed of n banks interacting in a spatial competition model à-la Salop (1979).   
We confirm the result of Semenova (2008) showing that banks will choose the incorrect information 
sharing in the last period to increase their profits. Interestingly, however, it is shown that this 
strategy is optimal at the second period only if the proportion of successful projects in the economy 
is superior to 50%. In that case, the Credit Bureau could prevent the information’s misreporting 
when it applies a sufficiently high penalty and withdraws the license of the deviating bank during the 
third period. It is shown that this penalty depends on many variables: the transportation cost, the 
proportion of high-ability entrepreneurs and the success probability of the risky investment projects. 
Applying a penalty below this threshold will not discourage the banks from choosing the dishonest 
strategy during the second and third periods.  
 
Appendix 
Proof of proposition 1 
Every bank i=1,…,n fixes the interest rate Ri1 that maximizes its first period profit:  
 
(A1)
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where : is the demand addressed to the bank i ; γ : the proportion of high-ability 
entrepreneurs; p: the probability of choosing successful projects; and : the banks’cost of capital. 
First, let’s determine the expression of the demand Di addressed to the bank i. Hence, we should 
determine the location x of the entrepreneur situated between bank i and bank i+1 and who is 
indifferent between the two banks when asking for a loan.  
 
The bank i will offer the interest rate Ri1 and the bank i+1 offers the interest rate R1. The indifference 
condition consists in equalizing the total cost of the two loans that could be granted by the two 
banks:  
 (A2)
Then we can find the expression of bank’s i demand: 
 
(A3)
Thus,  
 
(A4)
Using, the expression  it is clear that the bank i profit is a concave function 
of Ri1  as shown by the following figure: 
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Writing the first order condition, under the hypothesis that bank i considers the interest rate  R1 fixed 
by its rivals as exogenous (Cournot Competition), we find the gross interest rate   that maximizes 
the profit :  
 
(A5)
 
 
This value is strictly superior to  under the condition  which is necessary to 
guarantee a non-negative profit during the first period. Now, we use the symmetry of the problem 
and set    in (A5).  Hence, we obtain  
 
(A6)
Using (A1) we obtain the following expression of the first-period profit 
 
(A7)
 
It is now question to find the interest rates and the profit of the second period. The second period 
profit is given by 
 
 
(A8)
Where  and  are respectively the demand for loan addressed to 
bank i by the successful entrepreneurs (whose proportion γp is uniformly distributed around the 
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circle) and defaulting entrepreneurs (whose proportion 1-γp is uniformly distributed around the 
circle). Hence, the expressions of these two types of demand are analogous to (A4): 
 
 
 
(A9)
Noting that the maximization of  could be realized by maximizing separately its two 
components in (A8). In addition, these two separate problems are analogous to the maximization of 
. To obtain, the solution we have just to choose γ = 1 and f = 0 in (A1) for the maximization of 
the first term and replace p by  and f = 0 in (A1) for the maximization of the second term. The 
remainder of the proof is the same.  
We can find the remainder of the results following the same reasoning.   
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